During the past few years, a new wave of reform has been launched under the rubric of reinventing government. Yet, despite the hype, little is known about the extent to which reinventing government is a reality across the country. The authors undertake a systematic analysis of reform activity in a large sample of suburban municipalities and find low rates of adoption of current reforms. Although a number of identifiable and theoretically important institutional constraints inhibit reform activity, city manager leadership appears to be critical for overcoming the impediments to efficient governance.
decentralized, community owned, competitive, mission driven, results oriented, customer driven, and market oriented" (Wilson 1994, 38) .
The reinventing government movement comes on the heels of other recent experiments by national, state, and local governments with management tools developed in the private sector (e.g., total quality management and management by objectives) and with alternative service delivery arrangements. 1 One change is evident: Innovations were for the most part restricted to alternative service delivery arrangements and private-sector management techniques in the 1970s and 1980s, but a wider array of tools are being applied to public management in the 1990s (Gray and Jenkins 1995) . Still, despite the rhetoric that emphasizes what is new and different about the move to reinvent government, today's reforms have a goal that is congruent with previous reform movements-like their predecessors, they seek to make government more responsive, cost effective, and accountable (Volcker and Winter 1994, xi; DiIulio 1994, 24) .
Given all this activity, it is not surprising that reform is taken as a "fact" of contemporary local governance, widely discussed in the popular press and highlighted in political campaigns. Indeed, snapshots of reinvention activity abound, and successful reinvention efforts are frequently reported in the media. Dallas, Baltimore, Indianapolis, and San Diego have been trumpeted as examples of large cities in which attempts to reduce the number of management layers and simplify job classifications have addressed many of the classic complaints about civil service (Walters 1992, 31; Nathan 1994, 169) . New public-private partnerships in delivering services, part and parcel of the reinventing government movement, also have attracted media attention (Osborne and Gaebler 1992 ).
Yet, despite the hype and the frequent snapshots of urban reform presented in the media, very little is actually known about the extent to which reinventing government is a reality in the United States, particularly across the suburban landscape, where the majority of Americans now reside. Moreover, no systematic information exists about the types of reforms being implemented. And no rigorous studies identify the factors associated with the reinvention phenomenon.
Most work on the diffusion of reinventing government reforms has been descriptive and anecdotal, but our approach is based on the analysis of reform activity in a large sample of suburban municipalities and is informed by a fundamental argument: that the extent of local governmental reforms is a function of the incentives key actors in local politics have to engage in reform. And the incentives of suburban governmental actors differ sharply from those of their central-city counterparts.
REFORM IN SUBURBIA
Home to a majority of Americans, suburban municipalities operate in an environment in which competition with other suburbs for fiscally productive resources is intense. Given the centrality of the tax base to suburban politics, local policy makers are perennially forced to search for ways to retain higher-income, potentially mobile households (Peterson 1981) . Although governmental reform may in reality contribute only marginally to the goal of fiscal wealth maximization, we believe the search for Tiebout-like efficiency gains underlie the reinventing government movement. Insofar as governmental reform increases local government efficiency, reform may allow more services to be delivered per tax dollar, easing budget constraints and allowing local officials to reap credit with their constituents (Schneider 1989, 26) .
In addition to budget constraints, however, local decision makers encounter other pressures as well. For example, given that this competition for households and firms occurs within a spatially constrained and fragmented market, policy makers are under pressure to respond to the wishes of citizens and interest groups, including the chamber of commerce, taxpayer groups, good government groups, and public-sector unions. Moreover, suburban politics also is marked by a flurry of political entrepreneurship in which local actors use political reforms as tools to mobilize local groups and gain political credit (Schneider and Teske 1995) . Indeed, the theme of "efficiency gains via reform" may be a powerful, viable slate for electoral success.
Likewise, city managers may pursue reform not only to improve existing governance structures but also to earn reputational gains that translate into a move up to larger communities with larger staffs and larger budgets. Thus the status hierarchy within suburbia is itself a strong catalyst for suburban reform.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
To study the factors driving the current wave of local government reform, we started with a database of more than 1,400 incorporated municipal suburban communities in 55 metropolitan areas spread across 24 states. In a mail survey conducted in three waves during the summer of 1995, we queried city clerks about their community's use of a set of 16 policy innovations in the 1990s.
2 These policies all have been identified as components of the reinventing government movement (see especially Osborne and Gaebler 1992) . Specifically, we asked the city clerks to indicate which of these policies the local government had implemented. If the local government had not implemented a particular reform, we asked why not. We also asked city clerks a series of questions about the political conditions in their community. After three mailings, we obtained usable responses from 805 incorporated municipal suburban communities in more than 20 states (a response rate close to 60%). 3 We supplemented the information from our survey with data on population, employment, and services from various government censuses and with information on local taxes and fiscal conditions gathered from county and state reports. To correct for regional differences in the distribution of community conditions, we converted all local demographic and fiscal variables into z-scores by metropolitan statistical areas.
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Contrary to what the media and many advocates of the reinventing government movement would have one believe, a substantial number of communities in our sample reported zero reforms within each category. Although this is an interesting finding in itself, it also presents a statistical problem that must be taken into account if one is to model the distribution of reforms reliably (see Amemiya 1973 Amemiya , 1984 Tobin 1958) . We therefore use a Tobit model to estimate both the probability of finding any reform in a community and to identify the factors driving the reforms undertaken by the communities in our sample.
To capture the degree to which reinvention is a reality, we have created an index of total reform activity-all reforms-by summing across the set of 16 policy innovations. To give our analysis more specificity, we grouped these 16 policies into three major categories: civil service reforms (reducing bureaucratic rigidities introduced by rule-bound and outmoded civil service procedures and policies), employee empowerment reforms (emphasizing greater employee initiative and active participation in decision making and operations), and private-sector reforms (emphasizing competition in service delivery arrangements). We created an index of the number of policies implemented by the local government within each of these reform categories by summing across the dichotomous (yes/no) response for each relevant policy. 5 Table 1 describes the various reforms we included in our survey, and Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics on each of these reforms. These statistics reveal significant variation in the popularity of the reforms. Employee training is by far the most widely implemented type of reform adopted by local governments (by 60% of the communities in our sample). Streamlined procurement procedures and linking pay with performance also were widely adopted, although less so than employee training (undertaken by 37% and 35% of the sample, respectively). On the other end of the scale, only 6% of the communities chose to increase mayoral authority over managers, implying that the desire to enhance mayoral power is not widespread. Other reforms, including reducing the use of seniority in pay and promotion decisions and selling public assets, were adopted by about 15% of the communities, ranking fairly low on the diffusion scale.
In Table 2 , we report information on reform activity in each of the four broad categories. When focusing on the number of communities that have implemented at least one reform, a few patterns are evident. Despite a wide variety of civil service reforms from which to choose from, the mean number of reforms implemented was only 2.2 (out of a maximum of 10). Moreover, although enhancing competition in service delivery-through emulating private-sector practices and introducing alternative service delivery arrangements-was a popular reform in the preceding decade, our sample shows that these reforms seem to be lagging in the 1990s (the average number of reforms in this category that have been adopted in the 1990s is less than 1).
6 Overall reform activity, as measured by the all reforms index, is muted as well: The mean number of reforms implemented was only 3.9 (out of a maximum of 16).
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Although these descriptive statements are important in documenting the actual extent of current reforms, our goal is to move beyond simple description to develop a more complete explanation of the adoption of reforms. Our research question is straightforward: What local political, institutional, and organizational factors explain why some suburban communities are undertaking reforms while others are not?
URBAN INSTITUTIONS AND THE INCENTIVES FOR REFORM
At least since Lineberry and Fowler's (1967) seminal inquiry into reformism, scholars systematically have explored the effects of institutional arrangements on urban public policy making. Contemporary research has yielded a set of fairly robust findings (Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Morgan and Watson 1995; Schneider and Teske 1995) . These findings indicate, for example, that city managers and mayors face different constituency pressures (Morgan and Watson 1995) , that the election of city councils by district, rather than at-large, elections not only amplifies the level of conflict within city councils but also leads to differing service orientations and representational focus of council members (Welch and Bledsoe 1988) , and that availability of slack resources aids local political entrepreneurs in their attempts to transform the status quo (Schneider and Teske 1995) .
The theoretical framework we develop to explain ongoing reforms is firmly rooted within the context of local institutions-the system of electoral representation, the office of the mayor and city manager, the importance of interest groups in policy making-and various demographic attributes of suburban communities that define the demands on these institutions and the 438 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / January 1999 constraints they face. Viewing the reinventing reform movement as a change in the local institutional matrix that affects different actors in different ways, we argue that civil service, employee empowerment, and private-sector reforms are outcomes shaped by local institutional structures and the individuals who operate within these structures.
LEADERSHIP: MAYOR OR CITY MANAGER?
Central to our analysis is the role of leadership, which has been shown to be necessary if a governmental unit is to innovate successfully (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Dubnick 1994) . Within the structure of local politics, two key offices are central: the mayor and the city manager. Each office provides differing incentives for leadership to pursue reforms. In fact, scholars have documented that the relative importance of the manager and the mayor varies across communities. 8 Contemporary research indicates that mayors wield considerable influence within urban political structures (but also see Knott and Miller 1987, 236-37) . In addition to their policy-making role, mayors in council-manager cities also have been shown to facilitate decision making through their bargaining, networking, and negotiating skills (Svara 1987; Morgan and Watson 1992) . There is a tangible incentive for mayors to exert leadership in the present wave of reforms. Given both taxpayer resistance to the costs of government and current hostility to anything that resembles big government, mayors may be able to win favor with constituents by infusing competition in the delivery of public services and by advocating an overhaul of civil service practices.
Mayors are not the only important leaders in local government. Throughout the history of the council-manager plan, managers have played an active role in the policy process (Svara 1987, 77) . Highlighting the office of the city manager as the embodiment of professionalism in governance, Montjoy and Watson (1995, 231) characterize the manager as a "neutral expert" who efficiently and effectively carries out the policies of the city council. Beyond serving as neutral experts, however, city managers have been shown to be critical of the decisions of local governments to experiment with scientific management tools (Poister and McGowan 1984; Poister and Streib 1989; Berman and West 1995) . Thus managerial centrality in current reforms has more than a historical basis to it; robust theoretical underpinnings suggest that reform is fully compatible with the incentives managers face in local governance.
Hierarchical organizations are beset with a host of managerial problems. Managers often lack suitable monitoring and incentive mechanisms to control employee shirking and exhort workers to perform in tune with the mission of the bureaucracy (Miller 1992; Wilson 1989) . Managers face these problems in both the public and the private sectors but, as is well known, managers in municipal agencies are more constrained, often having little or no influence over pay raises, hiring, or promotions (Knott and Miller 1987, 239) . Previous reform movements have led to the creation of civil service rules and commissions designed to insulate local administration from legislative influences. These reforms often have acted as substitutes rather than complements to the office of the manager and, in fact, have complicated the coordination problems faced by city managers (see Frant 1989 Frant , 1993 .
In this light, reinventing government reforms has at least two related sets of payoffs for city managers. First, because these reforms aim at reducing the difficulty and costs of coordinating local operations, fiscal and managerial improvements may flow from their implementation. In addition, regardless of any actual improvements in policy that flow from these reforms, managers stand to benefit in terms of their reputation by successfully introducing reforms. Reputational gains can translate into more tangible personal rewards: Because managers are mobile and participate in a competitive national labor market, they stand to gain from a reputation for problem solving and the ability to enhance cost efficiency in governance by moving up to larger communities with larger staffs and budgets (Stein 1990, 92-93; Teske and Schneider 1994) . Competition for career advancement thus creates incentives to at least appear to outperform one's peers, especially in a setting in which "rewards are indivisible, outputs difficult to measure, and the link between action and outcome difficult to assess" (Horn 1995, 132-33) .
CONSTRAINTS ON LEADERSHIP
Leadership does not function in a vacuum; rather, it is affected by the environment within which an organization operates. Research on policy innovation has identified several factors that define the likelihood that leaders will advocate and implement reforms. Among the most important is the link between the availability of slack resources and the innovativeness of organizations (Mohr 1969; Walker 1969; Berry and Berry 1992) . Leaders who desire to challenge the status quo locate and use available slack resources, a strategy that facilitates challenge and increases the likelihood of eventual success (Schneider and Teske 1992, 738) . We measure the availability of slack resources via the community's property tax yield per capita (which increases slack) and the proportion of the local population with household incomes below $35,000 (which decreases slack).
INTEREST GROUPS AND MOBILIZATION FOR REFORM
For the most part, the reforms we analyze seek to alter the internal processes of local public service agencies-reorganizing hiring and firing, altering pay and promotion schemes, increasing the flexibility in assigning employees to different functions, and so forth. Other reforms aim specifically at infusing competition in local service delivery arrangements-allowing private contractors to bid against local agencies, negotiating with private contractors, and selling public assets.
Although the specific goal of each reform may differ, all of them represent a challenge to the status quo. However, if changes in the rules of the game are sought, particularly by those who stand to gain from the resulting alterations, it is logical to expect opposition to these proposed changes from interest groups that are likely to lose as the institutional structure changes. There is thus a strong link between organizational support (opposition) and the incentives (disincentives) generated by the reforms we analyze. We look next at the role of several local interest groups and how they might react to reinventing government.
We identify four main types of groups-each representing a different constituency-that can play critical roles in the reform of local government. The local chamber of commerce represents concentrated business interests, neighborhood groups represent citizens in specific geographical areas, and taxpayer groups represent dispersed citizen interests. The fourth group, public-sector workers, represents another potentially powerful force in local government, with distinct interests in the size and operation of government that can be quite different (and quite opposite) from these other groups (Schneider 1989) .
These four local interest groups enter into local politics under varied conditions and with different preferences. Consider the alignment of forces that may result when a local government seeks to implement a reform such as contracting out for services. By allowing private contractors to bid against public agencies, the monopoly position of existing public-sector units is threatened. Although public-sector unions may oppose civil service and private-sector reforms, we expect unions to support employee empowerment reforms. The rationale is simple: Increasing employee training and enhanced worker/union involvement in decision making strengthen the cooperative, problem-solving approach integral to current reforms. 9 On the other hand, it is logical to expect neighborhood groups, taxpayer groups, and the local chamber of commerce to support all three categories of reform. Their support is likely to stem from a perceived link between the reforms and increased efficiency in local governance.
Consequently, we include measures of the relative importance of these four interest groups in the local policy-making process as explanatory variables in our models of the reform process. 10 We note, however, that these groups are by no means the only local interests likely to influence policy making. Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) maintained that much of the potential pressure affecting the mode of service delivery (local governments'decisions to opt for private or intergovernmental contracting) is likely to come from service recipients. According to Ferris (1986, 300) , the groups most likely to have a vested interest in public services are blacks, low-income and lowermiddle-income households, and the elderly. Service recipients may perceive any deviation from the current mode of service delivery as a threat to service continuance or at least a weakening of existing service commitments. We test for service recipient-generated opposition to reform by including two measures-the proportion of the local population that is African-American and the proportion of local population older than age 65. 11 The opposition of both segments of the local populace also may be driven by an ideological predisposition opposing the "privatization" of local governance (Ferris 1986; McGuire, Ohsfeldt, and van Cott 1987; Morgan, Hirlinger, and England 1987) .
Incentives are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for interest group influence in policy making: A group may face powerful incentives to try and influence local policy makers, but those incentives do not guarantee influence per se. Each of these interest groups faces the problem of mobilizing its members to pressure local decision makers. Solving this collective action problem is relatively more difficult in communities that rely on at-large systems of representation than in communities with district elections (Schneider and Teske 1995) . We expect that communities relying for the most part on district elections are more likely to implement reforms than are jurisdictions that rely on at-large elections.
In our analysis, we also include a measure of density (measured by the population per square mile) to ensure continuity with public expenditure studies (McGuire, Ohsfeldt, and van Cott 1987; Hirsch 1995) . Given that we find variation across the four major census regions, regional influences are controlled for by including dummy variables that represent the census region in which the community is located-North Central, Northeast, and South. The West is the excluded category. 
SUBURBAN INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM
Recall the thrust of our argument regarding the dual incentives city managers have for pursuing reforms-they can gain in reputation and in improved control of local public agencies under their command. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to distinguish between the separate effects of these dual incentives.
12 In our multivariate analysis, however, we find that the city manager is the single actor most likely to exert influence on the extent of reform activities in his or her community. 13 In terms of the expected probability that a community will undertake some reforms (as compared to no reforms at all), the presence of a city manager increases the probability of finding civil service reforms by roughly 11%, employee empowerment by about 9%, private-sector reforms by about 11%, and all reforms by 7%.
Local interest groups exert some influence over both the probabilities of reform and the expected number of reforms. Neighborhood groups appear to provide an important base of support for change in the local environment: Their strength has a statistically significant effect on civil service, employee empowerment, and all reforms. Contrary to our hypothesis, public-sector unions increase the likelihood of a local government adopting civil service and private-sector reforms. We discuss this positive association between public-sector unions and reinvention activity in the concluding section.
Systems of electoral representation significantly affect the adoption of civil service reforms. Specifically, communities with district elections have a 6% higher probability of undertaking civil service reforms than do communities with at-large or mixed elections. Progressive Era electoral reforms, introduced at the same time as civil service reforms, emphasized at-large elections to weaken party organizations and make it more difficult for them to disperse benefits to supporters in particular geographic areas (e.g., Knott and Miller 1987) . As political parties lost power, over time, bureaucratic agencies increasingly came to control the dispersal of benefits to constituent groups that are relatively more dependent on government services: the elderly and low-income groups (Ferris 1986 ). In contrast, newer neighborhood groups tend to represent more middle-class citizen interests.
Here lies the nexus between the electoral structures and civil service reforms: District elections clearly increase the political impact of geographically based interests. More important, district elections "provide less than perfect representation of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds" (Welch and Bledsoe, 1988, 117) . This, in turn, gives more power to neighborhood-based middle-class interests who, as taxpayers, want to see reforms that reduce the size of government and increase the level of efficiency in service delivery.
14 This translates into political pressure for reforms Table 3 . McDonald and Moffit (1980) and Roncek (1992) provide a thorough explanation of the computations involved in decomposing Tobit coefficients. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
that weaken the hold of the civil service on bureaucratic institutions and service delivery. This mechanism, we believe, accounts for the relationship between district elections and the higher rate of adoption of civil service reforms.
THE RATIONALE OF ONGOING SUBURBAN REFORM
Our analysis provides a corrective to the hyperbole surrounding today's movement to reinvent government. Contrary to popular reports, current reforms have been implemented only sparsely by suburban municipalities. In fact, the low adoption rates we have found for current reforms are not much different from the rates reported by research on previous waves of reform, especially alternative service delivery arrangements. For example, Ferris (1986) found external production arrangements in less than 35% of the cities in his sample, and Stein's (1990, 56) landmark study provides even more conservative estimates. According to Stein, the cities he surveyed wholly contracted out only about 17% of 64 municipal service responsibilities, and partial contracting out was only 13%.
Thus our work shows that the historical "disconnect" between high levels of rhetoric and the actual adoption of reforms documented in earlier reform movements is again evident. But more important, our findings point to some fundamental patterns in the never-ending politics of local government reform.
Historically, civil service rules were designed to increase efficiency by isolating the administration of policies from the pressures of partisan politics. There is evidence that these reforms have served largely to impede public managers from accomplishing their mission by creating barriers to the efficient deployment of resources in the face of changing technologies and changing demands (Frant 1993, 991; Nathan 1994, 159-61) . 15 When such rigidities hinder the fluid allocation of labor and other resources to agency tasks, city managers face incentives for implementing civil service reforms and adapting other innovations from the private sector. As Wilson (1994, 25-26) 
noted,
The cure for inefficiency in civil service administration is to modernize it, to do essentially what the Progressives tried to do but to do it right-simplify job classification policies and procedures, introduce effective performance appraisal and reward programs. . . . The modernizer, however, finds restrictions at every turn. The very personnel rules and work regulations that have made the reforms necessary have also made it hard for Neo-Progressive initiatives to Table 3 . McDonald and Moffit (1980) and Roncek (1992) provide a thorough explanation of the computations involved in decomposing Tobit coefficients. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
succeed. And public employee unions have used these same regulations to weaken or block many modernizing reforms. (Emphasis added)
Our evidence shows that in today's reform movement, the city manager is most likely to play the role of "modernizer," and cities with managers are significantly more likely to have signed on to current reforms designed to increase efficiency.
However, at first glance, some of our findings seem to run contrary to Wilson's (1994) argument. Most notably, we have found that communities with stronger public-sector unions are undertaking more, not fewer, civil service and private-sector reforms. Yet we believe this finding reflects a political manifestation that is in fact congruent with Wilson's argument: In communities with stronger public-sector unions, there is a greater need for reform. In turn, managers in cities with strong unions are more likely to adopt reforms that seek to overcome the impediments posed by antiquated civil service rules and procedures protected by strong unions.
We believe that the motivation underlying this managerial response is twofold: to increase efficiency by repealing restrictive civil service procedures established under previous reform movements and to enhance the manager's professional reputation as a problem solver and administrative expert. These twin motivations enhance the incentives of city managers to push for reform and occupy a more central position in the reinventing government movement than in previous reform movements. Frant (1993) argued that civil service commissions were useful tools for restricting the patronage-dispensing behavior of mayors and city councilors. Adoption of these commissions was therefore motivated by the city council's desire for political control, and managerial incentives were inconsequential in the decision. 16 In contrast to this historically marginal role of city managers in local governments' decisions to adopt civil service commissions, we find that managerial incentives are pivotal factors in more contemporary attempts to reform personnel rules and governance. This raises an interesting question: Is this pivotal position a function of the growing professionalization of city governments and an accretion of power by city managers? Or is this a result of the specific types of programs that define today's reform movement? Unfortunately, we cannot answer these questions within the parameters of our present data.
Nonetheless, what we have shown is that local managerial leadership is crucial for the adoption of reforms. However, a city manager alone is no guarantee of reform. Local governments face a multitude of constraints that limit their ability to adopt reforms. Some of these constraints are generated by local political alignments. Other constraints are generated by the external environment: When the roughly 190 communities that failed to undertake any reform were asked why, 5% reported a "need for enabling legislation," and 7% mentioned "fiscal constraints." And some communities failed to be impressed by the reforms: For example, 5% reported that they anticipated "no apparent savings" from reforms.
More interestingly, on average, 50% of clerks in this subsample of cities said that their local government had not even discussed the reform in question. That so many governments in our sample failed even to consider reform further gives lie to the hype surrounding the movement to reinvent government.
Reforms and hyperbole have gone hand in hand in the past, and today's movement to reinvent government is no exception to this historical experience. But our evidence shows that ideas in good currency require more than the enthusiasm of the press and cheerleading from the president if they are to be implemented across the nation. The actual adoption of reinventing government reforms in the 1990s has been guided by the rational responses of local actors responding to the incentives they faced while operating under identifiable and theoretically important institutional constraints.
NOTES
1. On total quality management and management by objectives, see Berman and West (1995) , Streib (1989, 1995) , Poister and McGowan (1984) , and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) . On alternate service arrangements, see Ferris (1986); McGuire, Ohsfeldt, and van Cott (1987) ; Morgan, Hirlinger, and England (1987) ; Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) ; Stein (1990); and Hirsch (1995) .
2. Municipal city clerks are knowledgeable about the politics and political history of their communities (see Schneider and Teske 1995; Pelissero and Krebs 1997) , and we believe this makes them credible respondents.
3. There are negligible differences between the demographic profiles of the nonresponding communities and our subsample of 805 suburban municipal communities. For example, the mean percentage of African-Americans is within 2% of the full sample, and median family income is within $650 of the full sample.
4. The transformation ensures that each independent variable now reflects the standing of a community relative to its neighbors (see Schneider and Teske 1995; Collver and Semyonov 1979) .
5. Although we created these scales on the basis of face validity, supported by factor analysis, the scales are virtually identical to the classification employed by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) . We do not report the factor scales or the usual reliability scores because standard factoranalytic techniques are invalid when scales are composed of categorical items, as in this case. Reliance on the common factor analysis model when applied to dichotomous variables leads to bias as a result of the attenuation of the Pearson correlations on which factor analysis is based (see Muthen 1983 Muthen , 1989 ).
6. Of course, this may be a function of the successful diffusion of these types of reforms in the past decades. The pattern of adopting reforms often follows an "s-curve," and if the reforms had been widely adopted in a previous time period, then the rate of adoption in the current period could be low (Schneider and Teske 1995) . However, note that initial adoption rates were fairly low for service delivery arrangements (see Stein 1990; Ferris 1986 ).
7. Note that there is some regional variation in the number of reforms adopted by local governments. In our sample, jurisdictions in the West and South led communities in the Northeast and the North Central regions in reform activity. This finding is consistent with other research that has documented the innovativeness of states and municipalities in the West and South (Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Berman and West 1995) .
8. For example, Morgan and Watson (1992) and Svara (1987) maintained that the shoes of the dominant policy maker are filled at times by the mayor, and at other times the city manager assumes policy leadership.
9. See the National Partnership Council (1994), A Report to the President on Implementing Recommendations of the National Performance Review.
10. The measure of interest group strength in local policy making is the city clerk's assessment of the importance of each group on a 1 to 5 scale, with 5 registering very important. Therefore, the expected sign on the coefficients for an interest group is positive-the more important the group, the more the influence.
11. Recall that we have already included a measure of the concentration of lower-income residents in the community (the percentage with incomes less than $35,000) as a measure of slack resources.
12. Principal-agent theory (see Miller 1992) shows that whereas employees are caught in horizontal dilemmas, managers are caught in vertical dilemmas and consequently should be just as liable to shirk as are employees in general. This suggestion does not apply to the city managers in our framework for a simple reason: City managers want better control over local agencies and reputational gains. Managers would be inclined to shirk only if their sole interest was to enhance their reputation while not implementing reforms.
13. To verify the centrality of the city manager in the local reinvention movement, we also divided our sample into manager/nonmanager cities and compared the means for the four reform categories. The results corroborate the findings reported herein: Mean reform activity is consistently higher in manager cities.
14. The urban reform literature often suggests that district elections promote, rather than mitigate, governmental inefficiencies because ward competition for city services leads to increased spending. Although this hypothesis might be true for the central cities, we believe our results are fully consonant with the competitive suburban environment within which municipal governments historically have responded not only to the wishes of middle-and upper-income residents but also have assumed responsibility for relatively fewer social welfare services (see especially Schneider 1989) .
15. Therefore, it is not surprising that the National Commission on State and Local Public Service (see Nathan 1994) strongly emphasized the need to revamp governmental management structures.
16. In fact, Frant's (1993) analysis left many statistical and substantive questions unanswered. Both models Frant estimated reflect a large (and negative) impact of city managers on the decision to adopt civil service commissions and a negligible effect of competition between councilors. Frant's findings therefore suggest that adoption was not fueled by the desire for political control or because of managerial incentives. Consequently, the question of why some cities adopted civil service commissions while others did not remains unanswered.
